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The Impact of Participation in pan-European Competition on Domestic 
Performance in Association Football 
Abstract 
Research question: This paper empirically examines whether participation in the group stage 
of the UEFA Europa League has a causal impact on the performance of teams in national 
leagues. An appropriate methodology is adopted to address the selection bias that arises 
because Europa League participants tend to be stronger than other teams in their league due to 
the qualification criteria for pan-European competition. 
Research methods: Longitudinal data is used consisting of European teams in the top division 
of their country’s national league in the period 2009-10 to 2017-18. In order to address the 
selection bias, the regression discontinuity design estimator is employed. 
Results and findings: The results show no statistically significant effect from participation in 
the Europa League group stage on performance in national leagues for teams from stronger 
leagues but a positive and statistically significant effect for teams from weaker leagues. 
Implications: The results suggest that the knowledge gained and/or the financial benefits from 
group stage participation outweigh any negative effects arising from the travel and additional 
games required by participation in the group stages of the Europa League in weaker leagues. 
They are therefore supportive of increasing the share of UEFA competition revenues given to 
non-participating clubs in order to mitigate the negative effect of these competitions on 
domestic competitive balance. 
JEL codes: D22; L1; L83 
Keyword: Association football; pan-European competition; regression discontinuity design 
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The Impact of Participation in pan-European Competition on Domestic 
Performance in Association Football 
Introduction 
The simultaneous playing of national leagues and pan-European competition in association 
football has led to disagreement over the desirability of participation in the latter. While the 
Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) Champions’ League is the most prestigious 
and lucrative competition in club football (Burke, 2012), the secondary competition, the UEFA 
Europa League, has received criticism with some team managers suggesting that it would be 
better for their team if they did not qualify. For example, the former manager of Manchester 
United, Jose Mourinho, said ‘It [the Europa League] is not a competition that Man United 
wants… It’s more difficult, yes [to win the Premier League when you are playing in the Europa 
League]’ (Ducker, 2016). Such views can be explained by strains on playing squads arising 
from the additional games and travel required by the Europa League (Cox, Gilmore, and 
Graham, 2017). On the other hand, positive effects may be anticipated from the prize money 
earned from participation and the opportunities for learning from competing against higher-
quality teams. This paper provides evidence on the strength of these effects by empirically 
estimating the effect of Europa League participation on performance in domestic leagues. 
This question has important implications, not only for participants in pan-European 
competitions, but also for domestic competitive balance. Because the qualification rules ensure 
that participants are drawn from among the strongest teams in domestic leagues, positive 
effects would imply that pan-European competitions reduce domestic competitive balance. The 
uncertainty of outcome hypothesis (Rottenberg, 1956) posits that this will lead to lower 
attendances although the empirical evidence is not conclusive on this question (Buraimo & 
Simmons, 2015; Sung & Mills, 2018; Szymanski, 2003). The effects of pan-European 
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competition have particular contemporary relevance since UEFA has recently announced that 
a third competition, ‘Europa League 2’, will be introduced from 2021 (BBC Sport, 2018) which 
will mean that the effects of pan-European competition extend to more clubs and leagues. The 
results will also help inform discussion on the appropriate revenue distribution model for 
UEFA competitions and, more specifically, on whether more money should be disbursed to 
non-participating clubs to mitigate any reduction in competitive balance caused by these 
competitions (Bullough, 2018). 
Using data on European association football teams covering 2009-10 to 2017-18, this paper 
uses regression discontinuity design to identify the impact of participation in the Europa 
League on performance in domestic leagues.1 The results suggest that participation in the 
Europa League group stage has a positive and statistically significant effect on performance in 
national competitions for teams from weaker leagues but no significant effect for teams from 
stronger leagues. 
The next section provides some background information on the organization of domestic and 
pan-European competitions. The third section reviews the relevant literature. The fourth section 
describes the data and methodology and the fifth section presents the results. The final section 
concludes. 
                                                 
1 A related question that has recently been addressed by Green, Lozano, and Simmons (2015) 
is whether an increase in the probability of participation in pan-European competition leads 
teams to exert greater effort in domestic competition. This paper differs from that approach in 
seeking to establish whether participation is actually beneficial in terms of improving 





In order to provide an understanding of the Europa League and the various means of 
qualification, which are used below to identify the impact of participation, it is necessary to 
give some background information on the organization of national and pan-European football 
competitions. Most domestic leagues in Europe have a round-robin format such that all teams 
play each other a given number of times throughout the season. However, an increasing number 
of leagues split after a pre-specified number of fixtures with teams in the higher tier playing 
for the championship and qualification for European competition and teams in the lower tier 
competing to avoid relegation to a lower division. There is also substantial variation across 
Europe in the size of leagues: in the period under investigation, the largest league consisted of 
20 teams while the smallest league had only six teams. Information on the size and format of 
European leagues is provided in Table 1. Throughout the period, the number of points awarded 
for a win, draw and loss were three, one and zero respectively in all leagues. 
(Table 1 around here) 
UEFA’s association club coefficients rankings are used to determine the number of teams from 
each country that qualify for pan-European competition two seasons later. The coefficients are 
intended as a measure of league quality and are calculated as the sum of the mean number of 
points obtained by a country’s teams in pan-European competition over the previous five 
seasons (details on the method used are available from UEFA, 2011). Teams receive two points 
for a victory and one point for a draw (these are halved for qualifying rounds) and additional 
points are awarded for advancing to later rounds of the tournaments. In 2017-18, the leagues 
with the most participants (Spain, Germany and England) entered four teams in the Champions’ 
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League and three teams in the Europa League while most countries entered one team in the 
Champions’ League and three teams in the Europa League. 
While qualification for the Champions’ League depends on the finishing position of the team 
in the national league,2 places in the Europa League are awarded to the highest-placed teams 
that have not qualified for the Champions’ League and the winner of domestic cup 
competitions, of which there are two in England and France and one in other countries. If the 
team that wins the domestic cup competition has already qualified for the Champions’ League 
or Europa League by virtue of its league position, an additional place in the Europa League is 
allocated to the highest-placed team in the league that has not already qualified for European 
competition. Prior to 2014-15, the position was reallocated first to the runner-up in the domestic 
cup and, only if that team had already qualified for the Champions’ League or the Europa 
League, was the position given to the highest-placed team in the league that had not already 
qualified. A further means of entry to the Europa League until 2014-15 was through the UEFA 
Fair Play Ranking. This awarded an additional place to the three leagues with the best 
disciplinary record in European competitions over the previous season. These places were then 
awarded to the team with the best disciplinary record in the national league. There were 
therefore two means of qualifying for the Europa League, in addition to league position, during 
the period under investigation. 
Having qualified for the Europa League, most teams have to win preliminary rounds, which 
involve home and away fixtures, before reaching the group stage of the competition. Of the 48 
                                                 
2 The previous season’s winner also qualifies automatically but in only one season (2012-13) 
in the period under consideration has the club that won the Champions’ League failed to qualify 
by virtue of its league position. 
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group stage participants, the number that qualifies directly has increased from one in seasons 
2009-10 to 2011-12 (the previous year’s Europa League winner, if that team had not qualified 
for the Champions’ League), to seven in seasons 2012-13 to 2014-15 and has been 16 since the 
2015-16 season. Since 2009-10, there have been four qualifying rounds for the Europa League 
group stage (UEFA refers to three qualifying rounds and a play-off round). The UEFA 
coefficient, discussed above, and the league position of the club determine the round at which 
a team enters.3 This means that, particularly for teams from weaker leagues, participation in 
the Europa League usually does not lead to participation in the group stages of the competition. 
This is illustrated below in Table 2, which shows the number of teams that participated at any 
stage of the Europa League and the number of group stage participants from each country 
during the sampling period. Teams may also ‘drop down’ into the Europa League from the 
Champions’ League. During the sample period, the 15 teams that lost in the Champions’ 
League third qualifying round have played in the Europa League play-off round and the 10 
losing teams in the Champions’ League play-off round have played in the group stage of the 
Europa League. 
(Table 2 around here) 
The group stage involves 12 groups of four teams playing home and away fixtures in a round-
robin format (further detail on the Europa League group stage is provided by Krumer, in press). 
In order to qualify for the knockout phase of the tournament, teams must finish in first or second 
                                                 
3 For example, in 2016-17, the English teams finishing fifth and sixth in the national league 
entered the Europa League at the group stage and the team that finished seventh entered at the 




position in their group. All subsequent rounds of the tournament except the final also involve 
home and away fixtures. Teams that progress to the final will therefore play nine games, in 
addition to the six played in the group stage (and potentially more in the qualifying phase). 
Given the number of fixtures and distances involved (the current record is 3,700 miles for a 
match between Girondin de Bordeaux and Kairat Almaty), the potential for fatigue and hence 
a negative effect on performance in domestic leagues due is clear. 
 
Literature Review 
Much of the research on the effects of travel on performance has been motivated by a desire to 
explain the sources of home advantage (Carmichael & Thomas, 2005). In an early example, 
Pollard (1986) documents that in football matches involving London clubs where the opponent 
had travelled less than 200 miles, the home team won 64.3% of matches and in matches where 
the opponent had travelled more than 200 miles, the home team also won 64.3%, suggesting 
no disadvantage associated with greater distance travelled. Since then, the research on football 
has been rather limited. One recent example is Oberhofer, Philippovich, and Winner (2010) 
who investigate the performance of away teams in the German Bundesliga between 1986-87 
and 2006-07. They show that larger travel distances are associated with a higher probability of 
defeat. The effect is non-monotonic with the largest effects observed at shorter distances. 
In American sports, Nichols (2014), using data on National Football League (NFL) games 
between 1981 and 2004, finds that the probability of a home victory is a positive but decreasing 
function of the distance travelled by the visiting team. Carter (2017) examines the performance 
between 1998 and 2010 of teams participating in the National Collegiate Athletics Association 
(NCAA) Men’s Basketball Tournament, which is played at a neutral venue. She finds that 
teams have a higher probability of winning if they have traveled a much shorter distance than 
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their opponent but that no advantage is evident for smaller travel disparities. By contrast, 
Nutting (2010) finds little effect of distance travelled in the previous 28 days on the probability 
of victory and the score of home and visiting teams using data on National Basketball 
Association (NBA) seasons from 1990-91 to 2001-02. 
In relation to the effect of additional games, Scoppa (2015) finds a positive effect of extra days 
of rest on performance in Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup 
and UEFA European Championship matches before 1993 but no significant effect afterwards. 
The author attributes this to better preparation and hence a smaller effect of fatigue in more 
recent tournaments. Evidence from basketball is more supportive of the disadvantages of 
additional games. Entine and Small (2008) find that fewer rest days are associated with poorer 
performance and use this to show that a small part of the home-court advantage is explained 
by the fewer days of rest that visiting teams have between games. Similarly, Nutting (2010) 
finds that fewer rest days have a negative effect on the probability of winning, particularly for 
visiting teams, in the first half of the NBA season and that a larger number of games played in 
the previous 14 days by visiting teams lowers their probability of winning in the second half 
of the season. 
However, previous research shows that team managers, despite variations in efficiency (Frick 
& Simmons, 2008; Hall & Pedace, 2016), generally produce improved sporting outcomes from 
increased revenues (Dobson & Goddard, 1998; Hall, Szymanski, & Zimbalist, 2002; Kringstad 
& Olsen, 2016). This suggests that the money awarded for participation in pan-European 
competition may mitigate or wholly offset any fatigue effects by allowing teams to invest in 
additional or higher quality players. In 2017-18, teams that reached the group stages of the 
Europa League received €2.6 million while a win and draw in the group stages were rewarded 
with €360,000 and €120,000 respectively (UEFA, 2017). Additional sums were awarded for 
further progression in the competition and a total of €160 million was allocated to participants 
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based on the value of their country’s television market (a discussion of the UEFA distribution 
model is provided by Bullough, 2018). Given large variations in the availability of finance 
across countries (e.g. Deloitte, 2017), these sums are likely to be of greater importance to teams 
from weaker leagues.  
In addition to the financial benefits of participation, pan-European competition also allows 
teams to play against higher quality opposition than they would ordinarily encounter in 
domestic competition, which may improve their performance in the domestic league. The idea 
that players benefit from encountering higher quality opposition has spurred a number of papers 
showing that national football teams benefit from the migration of their players to play for 
clubs in stronger leagues (Allan & Moffat, 2014; Berlinschi, Schokkaert, & Swinner, 2013; 
Solberg, 2008). Similarly, a recent paper by Gong, Sun and Wei (2018) finds that young 
footballers benefit from the relegation of their team from the English Premier League because 
it gives them the opportunity to play more matches for the first team. Such results indicate that 
players receive knowledge benefits from competing at a higher level. This is consistent with a 
resource-based view of the firm (Barney, 1991; Gerrard, 2003; Wernerfelt, 1984) in which 
firms derive a competitive advantage from assets that cannot be replicated by other firms or 
easily substituted, one of which may be the tacit knowledge or experience of team members 
(Berman, Down & Hill, 2002; Franck, Nüesch & Pieper, 2011). However, teams in stronger 
leagues are less likely to benefit from such knowledge effects because the difference in 
standard between opponents in national and pan-European competitions will be smaller. 
Previous literature has therefore provided evidence of negative effects on performance from 
travel and additional games and positive effects from increased revenues and knowledge 
transfer. However, there has been little analysis of the effects of competitions such as the 
Europa League that potentially affect performance through all of these channels. As well as 
being of intrinsic interest, this will provide an insight into the relative importance of these 
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determinants of performance. The discussion of the effects of the Europa League has so far 
mostly taken place in the media and been limited to individual countries (BBC Sport, 2016; 
Honigstein, 2015; Hope, 2013; Wright & Nagle, 2015). An exception is Poli, Besson, and 
Ravenel (2015) who report that, between 2009-10 and 2014-15, 69.1% of teams that qualified 
for the Europa League group stage qualified for European competitions in the next season. 
However, since such teams will, as a result of the qualification criteria, tend to be among the 
strongest in their domestic leagues, they will have a higher probability of qualifying, regardless 
of their participation in European competition. This selection bias means that the higher 
probability of future qualification cannot be attributed to participation in European 
competition. Cox, Gilmore, and Graham (2017) provide a comprehensive analysis of the effects 
of participation in the Europa League for English teams. They show that teams tend to 
experience a fall in position in seasons in which they participate in the Europa League but 
acknowledge that ‘the relationship of the measurements analyzed between Europa League 
participation and non-participation reflects a correlation, not causality’ (p. 6). It is the aim of 
this paper to provide such a causal analysis. 
 
Data and Methodology 
Data have been collected for all European football leagues for seasons between 2009-10 and 
2017-18. The website of the Rec.Sport.Soccer Statistics Foundation (http://www.rsssf.com/) 
provides the necessary information on performance in domestic leagues while information on 
participation in European competitions is obtained from UEFA (www.uefa.com). However, 
only a sub-set of countries are used in the estimation sample for reasons that are outlined below. 
Given the qualification criteria outlined earlier, teams that qualify for the group stages of 
European competitions will tend to be stronger than teams that do not qualify and would be 
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expected to accumulate more points per game, even if they had not participated in European 
competition. Difference in mean estimates of the effect of participation will therefore be 
overestimates of the causal effect of participation. To address this, a regression discontinuity 
design approach is adopted (Imbens & Lemieux, 2008; Lee & Lemieux, 2010). In this context, 
regression discontinuity design entails a comparison of the performance of teams that narrowly 
qualified for the Europa League via league position with the performance of teams that 
narrowly failed to qualify for the European League via league position. The main empirical 
model is: 
 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑚𝑜𝑞𝑖𝑐𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑚𝑜𝑞𝑖𝑐𝑡−1 × 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝑐𝑐 + 𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡 (1) 
The dependent variable, 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑡, is the deviation of points per game from the cutoff, 
measured in points per game, required for a team to qualify for the Europa League via league 
position in the previous season. Comparisons of the points per game of teams in different 
leagues would provide valid estimates of the effect of participation if the cutoff required for 
qualification via league position was the same throughout the sample and the competitiveness4 
of leagues did not vary across country or time. In such circumstances, the points per game of, 
for example, a Romanian team that met the cutoff could be compared with the points per game 
of an English team that narrowly failed to reach the cutoff. The likelihood that the English team 
is stronger than the Romanian team is irrelevant since the focus of the analysis is on 
performance in national leagues. However, league competitiveness and the cutoffs required to 
qualify will vary across leagues and time. The model therefore includes country fixed effects 
                                                 
4 Competitiveness here refers to the difficulty of acquiring points for member teams. It is 
therefore concerned with the distribution of team quality within a league rather than the quality 
of the league relative to other leagues. 
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(𝑐𝑐) and time fixed effects (𝑡𝑡) to control for time-invariant differences across countries and 
changes that are common to all leagues respectively in competitiveness. Subtracting points per 
game from the cutoff required for Europa League qualification in the previous season controls 
for variations in the cutoff and country-specific changes in competitiveness, to the extent that 
the latter are captured by changes in the difficulty of qualifying for the Europa League via 
league position. The importance of the adjustment is demonstrated by the following example. 
The number of points per game required to qualify for the Europa League via league position 
in England was 1.895 in 2012-13 and 1.579 in 2014-15. If a team that met the cutoff in 2012-
13 and a team that narrowly failed to achieve the cutoff in 2014-15 obtained 1.7 points per 
game in the subsequent season, a comparison of the points per game of the two teams would 
suggest that Europa League participation had no effect. By contrast, a comparison using the 
deviation of points per game from the cutoff required for qualification via league position 
captures the fact that the team that met the cutoff in 2012-13 performed poorly relative to last 
season while the team that missed the cutoff in 2014-15 performed relatively well. This 
therefore implies a negative effect from Europa League participation. 
The treatment variable, 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑡, is a dummy variable indicating whether team 𝑖 from country 
c participated in the group stage of the Europa League in season t. Teams that played in earlier 
rounds of the competition, but failed to qualify for the group stages, are therefore considered 
as untreated. The rationale for this is, firstly, that participation in the group stages guarantees 
at least six games per season whereas qualification for the Europa League may only involve 
two fixtures. Secondly, group games take place at the same time as domestic fixtures but, for 
most leagues with ‘winter’ seasons, qualifying fixtures take place before the start of the season. 
The problems of fatigue associated with European football (discussed in the literature review) 
are therefore less likely to apply. Champions’ League participants are excluded from the 
estimation sample to facilitate a clean comparison between a treatment group of Europa League 
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group stage participants and a control group of teams that either failed to qualify for any 
European competition or were knocked out in the qualifying rounds of the Europa League. 
The running variable, 𝑚𝑜𝑞𝑖𝑐𝑡−1, is the margin by which a team qualified for the Europa League 
in the previous season, measured in points per game. It is therefore zero or positive for teams 
that qualified by virtue of their league position and negative for teams that did not.  Since the 
cutoff required to qualify differs by team, this is an example of regression discontinuity design 
with multiple cutoffs. Cattaneo, Keele, Titiunik, and Vazquez-Bare (2016) show that, in this 
case, 𝛽𝑅𝐷𝐷 is a weighted average of the local average treatment effect at each cutoff. 
𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡 is a dummy variable indicating whether a team’s league position led it to 
participate in the Europa League competition. The interaction between 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡 and 
𝑚𝑜𝑞𝑖𝑐𝑡−1 allows for different linear trends between the running variable and points per game 
across teams that qualified for the Europa League via league position and teams that did not. 
In order to reduce the sensitivity of the estimates to functional form, the sample is restricted to 
observations with values of 𝑚𝑜𝑞𝑖𝑐𝑡−1 close to zero. The bandwidth is chosen using the method 
of Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014). The model is estimated using triangular kernel 
weights although the results are also robust to the use of uniform weights. 
As explained in the second section, participation in the group stage of the Europa League is not 
determined solely by league position in the previous year. Teams that qualified for the Europa 
League competition via their league position (i.e. those for which 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡 equals one) do 
not participate in the group stages if they are knocked out in the qualifying rounds. Conversely, 
teams that failed to qualify for the Europa League via their league position (i.e. those for which 
𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡 equals zero) may reach the group stages if they qualify for the competition 
through their domestic cup competition or the fair play rankings and, if necessary, successfully 
negotiate qualifying rounds. Table A1 in the Supplemental Material summarizes the 
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relationship between 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡 and 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑡 and shows the number of teams that fall into 
each category. This non-deterministic relationship between 𝑚𝑜𝑞𝑖𝑐𝑡−1 and 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑡 
necessitates the use of a fuzzy regression discontinuity design in which 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡, is used 
as an instrumental variable for 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑡. Equation (1) is therefore estimated using two stage 
least squares as follows: 
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑡̂ = ?̂?1 + 𝛼𝐹?̂?𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝛼2̂𝑚𝑜𝑞𝑖𝑐𝑡−1 + 𝛼3̂𝑚𝑜𝑞𝑖𝑐𝑡−1 × 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝑐𝑐 + 𝑡𝑡 
𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑐𝑡̂ +𝛽2𝑚𝑜𝑞𝑖𝑐𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑚𝑜𝑞𝑖𝑐𝑡−1 × 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝑐𝑐 + 𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑐𝑡 
To be a valid instrument, 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡, must satisfy two criteria. Firstly, it must have a strong 
effect on the treatment indicator. In order to ensure this, the sample is restricted to leagues for 
which over 20% of the teams that qualified for the Europa League reached the group stage of 
the competition. This has the effect of reducing the number of group stage participants that 
remain in the sample after the application of further restrictions (described below) from 225 to 
210 but increases the percentage of qualifiers for the Europa League that reached the group 
stage from 28% to 58%. The resulting F-statistics for the significance of the instrumental 
variable in the first stage are over 10 in all samples (Stock, Wright, & Yogo, 2002). 
Secondly, the instrument must be uncorrelated with unobserved factors that determine both 
group stage participation and the deviation of points per game from the cutoff required for 
Europa League qualification via league position. For this assumption to be satisfied, all 
unobserved factors determining points obtained in the domestic league must be continuously 
related to the points obtained in the previous year’s competition, as measured by the running 
variable. The dummy variable, 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡, which has no obvious wider significance beyond 
determining whether the team participated in the Europa League, will then be uncorrelated with 
the unobserved factors determining performance since the latter will be ‘proxied’ by the 
(continuous) running variable. 
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The crucial role of the running variable in the identification strategy requires the exclusion 
from the sample of teams from leagues that underwent a change in league structure (either in 
terms of number of teams or a switch to or from a ‘split’ structure) between seasons 𝑡 − 1 and 
𝑡. In such circumstances, the previous season’s performance will be a weak predictor of the 
current season’s performance because of changes in the difficulty of earning points. Similar 
reasoning requires the exclusion of teams from countries where the league splits after a given 
number of games. This is because the running variable is calculated using the post-split number 
of points in the top group. If pre-split points are used to calculate the dependent variable, the 
running variable may not be a strong predictor because of the lower quality of teams 
encountered prior to the split. An alternative is to use post-split points to construct the 
dependent variable but this is also problematic because teams competing in different post-split 
groups play different teams and points per game is therefore not a reliable measure of team 
performance (teams in the ‘relegation’ group can finish the season with more points than teams 
in the ‘championship’ group). 
In order to test for heterogeneous effects across leagues of different strength, the model is 
estimated for the full sample and separately for ‘elite’ and ‘non-Elite’ leagues. The rationale 
for this approach is, as discussed above, that the knowledge benefits from participating in the 
Europa League will be weaker and the prize money may be less important for teams from 
stronger leagues. Five leagues are considered ‘elite’ based on their UEFA coefficients in 2009. 
These are England, Spain, Italy, Germany and France.   
 
Results 
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the relationship between the running variable, 
the margin of qualification, and the participation in the Europa League group stage and the 
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deviation of points per game from the previous year’s cutoff for qualification for the full sample 
and the two sub-samples. To provide consistency with the results from the regression 
discontinuity design, the graphs are drawn using only the data that falls within the bandwidth 
used to estimate equation (1). The graphs on the left-hand side show a non-zero probability of 
participation in some bins to the left of the cutoff because of the possibility of Europa League 
qualification through the domestic cup competition or the UEFA Fair Play Ranking. To the 
right of the cutoff, the probability of participation in the group stage of the Europa League is 
less than one in a number of bins due to the qualifying rounds that needs to be negotiated before 
a team reaches the group stage of the competition. Nevertheless, there is an obvious 
discontinuity in both the full sample and the two sub-samples in the probability of participation 
in the group stage around the cutoff. The graphs on the right-hand side show that teams that 
qualified for the Europa League through their domestic league position generally obtained 
more points per game in the next season. However, there is no clear discontinuity at the cutoff 
in the full sample, which suggests no significant effect of participation in the Europa League 
group stage on performance in national leagues.5 For the ‘non-elite’ leagues, there is a jump at 
                                                 
5 If league position was the only way of qualifying for the Europa League and there were no 
qualifying rounds, it would fully determine group stage participation and the gap at the cutoff 
shown in the graphs on the right-hand side of Figure 1 would show the estimated effect of 
group stage participation (as in a sharp regression discontinuity design). In a fuzzy regression 
discontinuity design with no covariates, the gap represents the reduced form estimate, which is 
rescaled to calculate the estimated treatment effect by dividing by the first-stage estimate to 
reflect the non-deterministic relationship between league position and group stage 
participation. The first-stage estimate is represented by the gap at the cutoff shown in the graphs 
on the left-hand side of Figure 1. 
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the cutoff but, for the ‘elite’ leagues, there is a drop in the deviation of points per game from 
the previous year’s cutoff. It is noteworthy that, while the slope on the left of the threshold is 
shallower than that on the right of the threshold in Figure 1, this is the result of limiting the 
sample to observations that fall within the bandwidth: in the full sample, the slopes are similar 
on both sides of the threshold (see Figure A1 in the Supplemental Material). 
(Table 3 around here) 
(Figure 1 around here) 
Although the results from estimation of equation (1), presented in Table 3, cannot be fully 
reconciled with those implied by Figure 1 due to the inclusion of country and time effects in 
the regression model, they are nevertheless consistent. In the full sample, there is no statistically 
significant effect of Europa League group stage participation (estimates from the reduced form 
and first stage models, the ratio of which gives the treatment effect estimates in Table 3, are 
presented in Table A2 in the Supplemental Material). The estimated effect is an increase in 
points per game of 0.129, which is the equivalent of only four points (one win and a draw) over 
the course of a 34 game season. The estimated effect for ‘elite’ leagues is negative but not 
statistically significant. However, a positive and significant effect is found for ‘non-elite’ 
leagues. In these leagues, participation leads to an increase in points per game of 0.380, which 
is the equivalent of an additional 13 points (four victories and a draw) over a 34 games season. 
This is consistent with the hypothesis that teams from weaker leagues learn from Europa 
League group stage participation or that that the prize money obtained is sufficient to allow 
them to improve their squad, relative to their domestic rivals. Estimation of equation (1) 
augmented with a set of interactions with a dummy variable that equals one if the team is from 
an ‘elite’ league using the full sample confirms that the difference between the estimated effects 
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of group stage participation for the ‘elite’ and ‘non-elite’ leagues is statistically significant at 
the 5% level. 
One possible threat to the validity of the identification strategy is that some teams, particularly 
in stronger leagues, may deliberately underperform in order to avoid participation in the Europa 
League. We regard this as unlikely to apply for the vast majority of teams, agreeing with 
Feddersen, Humphreys, and Soebbing (2012) that the ‘Europa League… should be financially 
attractive enough to generate strong incentives for teams to perform in the domestic league’ (p. 
11). Moreover, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of no manipulation of the running 
variable using the test proposed by Cattaneo, Jansson, and Ma (2017). 
A second potential threat to the validity of the regression discontinuity design estimates is that 
the discontinuity observed in the right-hand panel of Figure 1, and reflected in the coefficient 
estimates in Table 3, is unrelated to group stage participation. In order to test if there are other 
discontinuities away from the cutoff, the model is re-estimated using cutoffs to the left of the 
‘true’ cutoff for Europa League participation. Table A3 in the Supplemental Material shows 
that none of the estimated coefficients from the models using ‘placebo’ cutoffs are statistically 
significant. This provides confidence that the deviation of points per game from the previous 
year’s cutoff for qualification for the Europa League is a continuous function of the running 
variable and that the discontinuity identified in Figure 1 is truly associated with Europa League 
qualification. 
A third possible problem is that the assumed linear relationship between the margin of 
qualification and the deviation of points per game from the cutoff within the bandwidth is 
incorrect. Table A4 in the Supplemental Material therefore presents estimates from equation 
(1) augmented with second order polynomials of the running variable. The estimates remain 
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the same in terms of both sign and significance as those presented in Table 3. Moreover, the 
additional variables are jointly insignificant at the 10% level. 
The results presented so far have used a treatment variable coded as one when teams qualify 
for the group stage of the Europa League. An alternative specification is a dummy variable that 
equals one if teams qualify for the Europa League. As discussed above, the disadvantage of 
this approach is that some teams considered as ‘treated’ may only have played one round of 
European competition. Table 4 shows that all the estimated effects are smaller (in absolute 
value) lower than those in Table 3 but the estimated effect for the ‘non-elite’ group remains 
statistically significant. This weakening of the estimated treatment effects is consistent with a 
priori expectations that fewer games (i.e. a lower treatment intensity) will lead to smaller 
effects on domestic performance. 
(Table 4 around here) 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has investigated the impact of participation in pan-European competitions on 
performance in domestic leagues. Regression discontinuity design estimates indicate a large 
and positive effect for teams from weaker leagues. This finding is supportive of the proposition 
that teams learn from playing against higher quality opposition and, as such, is consistent with 
previous papers that have found that players benefit from playing at a higher level (Berlinschi, 
Schokkaert, & Swinner, 2013; Gong, Sun & Wei, 2018). An alternative explanation is that the 
prize money received from participation allows teams from weaker leagues to invest more in 
their squad than other teams in the league. Both effects are likely to be smaller in stronger 
leagues, where the domestic opposition is of a higher standard and other sources of finance are 
more easily accessible. Although the estimated effect for ‘elite’ leagues is negative, it is not 
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statistically significant. The results therefore do not provide evidence in favour of the 
hypothesis that fatigue from the travel and additional games required by Europa League group 
stage participation is disadvantageous for clubs over the course of the season. This is consistent 
with the finding of Scoppa (2015) that fewer rest days no longer have a negative effect on 
performance at the World Cup. 
Although individual teams from weaker leagues may benefit from participation in the Europa 
League, this does not necessarily mean that their domestic league benefits. In particular, the 
results imply that the Europa League further strengthens the stronger teams in domestic leagues 
and hence leads to a decline in competitive balance. This accords with research on the effect 
of the Champions’ League in England, Spain, Italy, Germany, and France (the ‘elite’ leagues 
used here) by Pawlowski, Breuer, and Hovemann (2010). This finding is pertinent at a time 
when UEFA is planning to introduce ‘Europa League 2’, which will increase the number of 
leagues with teams participating in pan-European competitions. It also provides support to 
proposals from the Association of European Professional Leagues (2018) to increase the share 
of revenues from UEFA competitions that are allocated to non-participating clubs in the form 
of ‘solidarity payments’ from the current level of 4% (UEFA, 2018). 
A limitation of the approach taken here is the inability to separate the effects of prize money 
and learning. Future research could address this through the use of information on the amount 
of prize money received from participation to isolate the effect of learning although such an 
approach would be complicated by the possibility that teams invest at the start of the season 
based on expectations of prize money, rather than the amount of money they actually receive. 
A more promising method may therefore be to construct measures of the quality of opponent 
encountered in the Europa League in order to measure the potential knowledge gained from 
participation. The use of individual game data would also provide further insights. In particular, 
it would allow better tests of whether fatigue has a negative effect on performance since such 
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effects may be short-term and offset over the course of the season by knowledge or prize money 
effects. 
A further limitation is the neglect of the premier European competition, the Champions’ 
League. Unlike the Europa League, qualification for the Champions’ League is generally 
regarded as a major achievement. As a result, future research could investigate whether the 
Champions’ League differs from the Europa League in having a positive effect on performance 
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Table 1. League Size and Format by Country and Season 
Season end 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Albania 12 12 14 14 12 10 10 10 10 
Andorra 8b 8b 8b 8b 8b 8b 8b 8b 8b 
Armenia 8a 8a  8 8 8 8 6 6 
Austria 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Azerbaijan 12b 12b 12b 12b 10 10 10 8 8 
Belarus 12a 12a 12a 12ab 12ab 14a 16a 16a  
Belgium 16b 16b 16b 16b 16b 16b 16b 16b 16b 
Bosnia 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 12b 12b 
Bulgaria 16 16 16 16 14b 12b 10 14b 14b 
Croatia 16 16 16 12 10 10 10 10 10 
Cyprus 14b 14b 14b 14b 14b 12b 14b 14b 14b 
Czech Republic 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Denmark 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 14b 14b 
England 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Estonia 10a 10a 10a 10a 10a 10a 10a 10a  
FYROM 12 12 12 12 12 10b 10b 10 10 
Faroe Islands 10a 10a 10a 10a 10a 10a 10a 10a  
Finland 14a 12a 12a 12a 12a 12a 12a 12a  
France 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Georgia 10 10 12b 12b 12b 16 16 10a  
Germany 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Greece 16 16 16 16 18 18 16 16 16 
Hungary 16 16 16 16 16 16 12 12 12 
Iceland 12a 12a 12a 12a 12a 12a 12a 12a  
Ireland 10a 10a 12a 12a 12a 12a 12a 12a  
Israel 16b 16b 16b 14b 14b 14b 14b 14b 14b 
Italy 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Kazakhstan 12ab 12ab 14a 12ab 12ab 12ab 12ab 12ab  
Latvia 10a 9a 10a 10a 10a 8a 8a 8a  
Lithuania 11a 12a 10a 9a 10a 10a 8ab 8ab  
Luxembourg 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Malta 10b 10b 12b 12b 12b 12 12 12 14 
Moldova 12 14 12 12 12 11 10 11  
Montenegro 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 10 
Netherlands 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Northern Ireland 12b 12b 12b 12b 12b 12b 12b 12b 12b 
Norway 16a 16a 16a 16a 16a 16a 16a 16a  
Poland 16 16 16 16 16b 16b 16b 16b 16b 
Portugal 16 16 16 16 16 18 18 18 18 
Romania 18 18 18 18 18 18 14b 14b 14b 
Russia 16a  16
b 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Scotland 12b 12b 12b 12b 12b 12b 12b 12b 12b 
Serbia 16 16 16 16 16 16 16b 16b 16b 
Slovakia 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12b 
Slovenia 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Spain 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Sweden 16a 16a 16a 16a 16a 16a 16a 16a  
Switzerland 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Turkey 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Ukraine 16 16 16 16 16 14 14 12b 12b 
Wales 18 12b 12b 12b 12b 12b 12b 12b 12b 
a denotes ‘summer’ season. b denotes split season. This table shows the number of teams at the start of the season. 
For example, the Swiss Super League finished with nine teams in 2011-12 due to the expulsion of Neuchâtel 
Xamax. Shaded cells indicate exclusion from the estimation sample for reasons outlined in Section 3. 
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Table 2. Number of Europa League Participants by Country and Season 
Season end 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Albania 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 1 (3) 0 (2) 1 (3) 
Andorra 0 (1) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (2) 0 (2) 0 (2) 0 (2) 0 (2) 0 (2) 
Armenia 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 
Austria 4 (3) 2 (3) 3 (3) 1 (3) 2 (3) 1 (3) 1 (3) 3 (3) 2 (3) 
Azerbaijan 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 1 (3) 0 (3) 1 (3) 2 (3) 2 (3) 0 (3) 
Belarus 1 (3) 1 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 1 (3) 1 (3) 0 (3)  
Belgium 2 (3) 3 (3) 3 (3) 2 (3) 3 (3) 3 (3) 2 (3) 4 (3) 1 (3) 
Bosnia 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 
Bulgaria 2 (3) 2 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 1 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 1 (3) 
Croatia 1 (3) 2 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 2 (3) 2 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 1 (3) 
Cyprus 0 (3) 0 (3) 1 (3) 1 (3) 2 (3) 1 (3) 1 (3) 1 (3) 1 (3) 
Czech Republic 2 (3) 1 (3) 0 (3) 2 (3) 1 (3) 1 (3) 3 (3) 3 (3) 3 (3) 
Denmark 1 (4) 1 (4) 2 (3) 1 (3) 1 (3) 2 (3) 1 (3) 0 (3) 1 (3) 
England 2 (3) 2 (3) 4 (4) 3 (3) 3 (3) 2 (3) 2 (4) 2 (3) 2 (2) 
Estonia 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3)  
FYROM 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 1 (3) 
Faroe Islands 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3)  
Finland 0 (3) 0 (4) 0 (3) 0 (4) 0 (4) 1 (4) 0 (3) 0 (3)  
France 2 (3) 2 (3) 2 (3) 3 (3) 2 (3) 3 (3) 4 (3) 2 (3) 3 (3) 
Georgia 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3)  
Germany 3 (3) 3 (3) 2 (3) 4 (3) 2 (3) 2 (3) 3 (3) 2 (3) 3 (3) 
Greece 2 (3) 3 (3) 2 (3) 1 (3) 1 (3) 3 (3) 2 (3) 3 (3) 1 (3) 
Hungary 0 (3) 1 (3) 0 (3) 1 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 
Iceland 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3)  
Ireland 0 (3) 0 (3) 1 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (4) 1 (3)  
Israel 1 (3) 0 (3) 3 (3) 2 (3) 2 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 2 (3) 2 (3) 
Italy 3 (3) 4 (3) 2 (3) 4 (3) 2 (3) 4 (3) 3 (3) 4 (3) 3 (3) 
Kazakhstan 0 (3) 0 (4) 0 (3) 0 (3) 1 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 1 (3)  
Latvia 1 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3)  
Lithuania 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3)  
Luxembourg 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 
Malta 0 (3) 0 (2) 0 (2) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 
Moldova 1 (3) 1 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 1 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3)  
Montenegro 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 
Netherlands 4 (4) 3 (4) 3 (3) 2 (5) 2 (4) 2 (4) 3 (4) 3 (3) 1 (3) 
Northern Ireland 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3)  
Norway 0 (3) 1 (3) 0 (4) 2 (4) 1 (4) 0 (4) 2 (3) 0 (3)  
Poland 0 (3) 1 (3) 2 (3) 0 (3) 1 (3) 1 (3) 2 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 
Portugal 3 (4) 2 (3) 2 (4) 3 (3) 3 (3) 2 (3) 3 (3) 1 (3) 2 (3) 
Romania 4 (4) 1 (4) 3 (4) 1 (3) 1 (3) 2 (3) 0 (3) 2 (3) 1 (3) 
Russia 0 (3) 2 (0) 2 (3) 2 (4) 3 (4) 2 (4) 3 (3) 2 (3) 2 (3) 
Scotland 1 (4) 0 (3) 1 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 1 (3) 1 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 
Serbia 1 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 1 (3) 0 (3) 1 (3) 1 (3) 0 (3) 2 (3) 
Slovakia 0 (3) 0 (3) 1 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 1 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 
Slovenia 0 (3) 0 (3) 1 (3) 1 (3) 1 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 
Spain 3 (3) 4 (3) 2 (3) 3 (3) 3 (3) 2 (3) 2 (2) 3 (2) 3 (3) 
Sweden 0 (3) 0 (4) 1 (4) 2 (3) 1 (4) 0 (4) 0 (3) 0 (3)  
Switzerland 1 (3) 2 (3) 1 (3) 2 (3) 2 (3) 2 (3) 2 (3) 2 (3) 2 (3) 
Turkey 2 (3) 1 (3) 1 (3) 1 (3) 1 (3) 2 (3) 2 (3) 3 (3) 2 (3) 
Ukraine 1 (3) 3 (4) 3 (4) 2 (4) 3 (4) 3 (4) 1 (3) 2 (3) 2 (3) 
Wales 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 0 (3) 
Numbers in parentheses show qualifiers for Europa League (as opposed to participants in the group stage). Shaded 
cells indicate exclusion from the estimation sample for reasons outlined in Section 3. Note that group stage 
participants can exceed qualifiers if teams ‘drop down’ from the Champions’ League (see footnote 6). 
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Table 3. Estimated Effects of Europa League Group Stage Participation 
 All Non-Elite Elite 
EL Group Participation 0.129 0.380** -0.092 
(0.111) (0.169) (0.161) 
Margin of Qualification -0.162 -0.040 0.209 
(0.575) (0.586) (1.597) 
Margin of Qualification x 
Qualified 
1.477** 0.918 2.307 
(0.724) (0.908) (1.618) 
Constant -0.172** -0.223** -0.099 
(0.086) (0.105) (0.161) 
    
Bandwidth 0.192 0.207 0.141 
Manipulation Test p-valuea 0.434 0.725 0.527 
F-statistic on IV 56.885 26.244 30.219 
    
Total    
Observations 1,385 811 574 
Treated 210 103 107 
Untreated 1,175 708 467 
Right of Cutoff 297 186 111 
Left of Cutoff 1,088 625 463 
    
Within Bandwidth    
Observations 430 269 150 
Treated 136 61 73 
Untreated 294 208 77 
Right of Cutoff 225 139 90 
Left of Cutoff 205 130 60 
Standard errors, clustered by team, are in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
a Teams with a margin of qualification of zero are omitted from the sample used to conduct 
this test since, by construction, each league has at least one team at this point in each season.
31 
 
Table 4. Estimated Effects of Europa League Participation 
 Restricted Sample 
 All Non-Elite Elite 
EL Participation 0.051 0.158** -0.051 
(0.052) (0.068) (0.140) 
Margin of Qualification 0.086 -0.236 -0.037 
(0.431) (0.549) (2.362) 
Margin of Qualification x 
Qualified 
1.425** 1.377* 1.475 
(0.613) (0.808) (2.706) 
Constant -0.157** -0.185** -0.109 
(0.080) (0.093) (0.158) 
    
Bandwidth 0.224 0.229 0.110 
Manipulation Test p-valuea 0.434 0.725 0.527 
F-statistic on IV 1296.798 560.544 556.098 
    
Total    
Observations 1,385 811 574 
Treated 361 230 131 
Untreated 1,024 581 443 
Right of Cutoff 297 186 111 
Left of Cutoff 1,088 625 463 
    
Within Bandwidth    
Observations 494 275 133 
Treated 269 161 87 
Untreated 225 114 46 
Right of Cutoff 245 141 86 
Left of Cutoff 249 134 47 
Standard errors, clustered by team, are in parentheses. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
a Teams with a margin of qualification of zero are omitted from the sample used to conduct 
this test since, by construction, each league has at least one team at this point in each season. 
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Figure 1. Regression Discontinuity Plot 
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